Warning
This document is for an old release of Galaxy. You can alternatively view this page in the latest release if it exists or view the top of the latest release's documentation.
Source code for galaxy.util.path
"""Path manipulation functions.
"""
import errno
import imp
import logging
import shlex
from functools import partial
try:
from grp import getgrgid
except ImportError:
getgrgid = None # type: ignore
from itertools import starmap
from operator import getitem
from os import (
extsep,
makedirs,
stat,
walk
)
from os.path import (
abspath,
basename,
dirname,
exists,
isabs,
islink,
join,
normpath,
pardir,
realpath,
relpath,
sep as separator,
)
try:
from pwd import getpwuid
except ImportError:
getpwuid = None # type: ignore
import galaxy.util
WALK_MAX_DIRS = 10000
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def safe_path(path, allowlist=None):
"""Ensure that a the absolute location of the path (after following symlinks) is either itself or on the allowlist
of acceptable locations.
This function does not perform an existence check, thus, if the path does not exist, ``True`` is returned.
:type path: string
:param path: a path to check
:type allowlist: comma separated list of strings
:param allowlist: list of acceptable locations
:return: ``True`` if ``path`` resolves to itself or a allowlisted location
"""
return any(__contains(dirname(path), path, allowlist=allowlist))
[docs]def safe_contains(prefix, path, allowlist=None, real=None):
"""Ensure a path is contained within another path.
Given any two filesystem paths, ensure that ``path`` is contained in ``prefix``. If ``path`` exists (either as an
absolute path or relative to ``prefix``), it is canonicalized with :func:`os.path.realpath` to ensure it is not a
symbolic link that points outside of ``prefix``. If it is a symbolic link and ``allowlist`` is set, the symbolic link
may also point inside a ``allowlist`` path.
The ``path`` is checked against ``allowlist`` using either its absolute pathname (if passed in as absolute) or
relative to ``prefix`` and canonicalized (if applicable). It is *not* ``os.path.join()``ed with each ``allowlist``
directory.
:type prefix: string
:param prefix: a directory under which ``path`` is to be checked
:type path: string
:param path: a filename to check
:type allowlist: list of strings
:param allowlist: list of additional paths under which ``path`` may be located
:rtype: bool
:returns: ``True`` if ``path`` is contained within ``prefix`` or ``allowlist``, ``False`` otherwise.
"""
return any(__contains(prefix, path, allowlist=allowlist, real=real))
class _SafeContainsDirectoryChecker:
def __init__(self, dirpath, prefix, allowlist=None):
self.allowlist = allowlist
self.dirpath = dirpath
self.prefix = prefix
self.real_dirpath = realpath(join(prefix, dirpath))
def check(self, filename):
dirpath_path = join(self.real_dirpath, filename)
if islink(dirpath_path):
return safe_contains(self.prefix, filename, allowlist=self.allowlist)
else:
return safe_contains(self.prefix, filename, allowlist=self.allowlist, real=dirpath_path)
[docs]def safe_makedirs(path):
"""Safely make a directory, do not fail if it already exists or is created during execution.
:type path: string
:param path: a directory to create
"""
# prechecking for existence is faster than try/except
if not exists(path):
try:
makedirs(path)
except OSError as e:
# reviewing the source for Python 2.7, this would only ever happen for the last path element anyway so no
# need to recurse - this exception means the last part of the path was already in existence.
if e.errno != errno.EEXIST:
raise
[docs]def safe_relpath(path):
"""Determine whether a relative path references a path outside its root.
This is a path computation: the filesystem is not accessed to confirm the existence or nature of ``path``.
:type path: string
:param path: a path to check
:rtype: bool
:returns: ``True`` if path is relative and does not reference a path in a parent directory, ``False``
otherwise.
"""
return not (isabs(path) or normpath(path).startswith(pardir))
[docs]def safe_walk(path, allowlist=None):
"""Walk a path and return only the contents that are not symlinks outside the path.
Symbolic links are followed if a allowlist is provided. The path itself cannot be a symbolic link unless the pointed
to location is in the allowlist.
:type path: string
:param path: a directory to check for unsafe contents
:type allowlist: list of strings
:param allowlist: list of additional paths under which contents may be located
:rtype: iterator
:returns: Iterator of "safe" ``os.walk()`` tuples found under ``path``
"""
for i, elems in enumerate(walk(path, followlinks=bool(allowlist)), start=1):
dirpath, dirnames, filenames = elems
_check = _SafeContainsDirectoryChecker(dirpath, path, allowlist=None).check
if allowlist and i % WALK_MAX_DIRS == 0:
raise RuntimeError(
'Breaking out of walk of %s after %s iterations (most likely infinite symlink recursion) at: %s' %
(path, WALK_MAX_DIRS, dirpath))
_prefix = partial(join, dirpath)
prune = False
for dname in dirnames:
if not _check(join(dirpath, dname)):
prune = True
break
if prune:
dirnames = map(basename, filter(_check, map(_prefix, dirnames)))
prune = False
for filename in filenames:
if not _check(join(dirpath, filename)):
prune = True
break
if prune:
filenames = map(basename, filter(_check, map(_prefix, filenames)))
yield (dirpath, dirnames, filenames)
[docs]def unsafe_walk(path, allowlist=None, username=None):
"""Walk a path and ensure that none of its contents are symlinks outside the path.
It is assumed that ``path`` itself has already been validated e.g. with :func:`safe_relpath` or
:func:`safe_contains`. This function is most useful for the case where you want to test whether a directory contains
safe paths, but do not want to actually walk the safe contents.
:type path: string
:param path: a directory to check for unsafe contents
:type allowlist: list of strings
:param allowlist: list of additional paths under which contents may be located
:rtype: list of strings
:returns: A list of "bad" files found under ``path``
"""
unsafe_paths = []
for walked_path in __walk(abspath(path)):
is_safe = safe_contains(path, walked_path, allowlist=allowlist)
if username and is_safe:
is_safe = full_path_permission_for_user(path, walked_path, username=username, skip_prefix=True)
if not is_safe:
unsafe_paths.append(walked_path)
return unsafe_paths
def __path_permission_for_user(path, username):
"""
:type path: string
:param path: a directory or file to check
:type username: string
:param username: a username matching the systems username
"""
if getpwuid is None or getgrgid is None:
raise NotImplementedError("This functionality is not implemented for Windows.")
group_id_of_file = stat(path).st_gid
file_owner = getpwuid(stat(path).st_uid)
group_members = getgrgid(group_id_of_file).gr_mem
oct_mode = oct(stat(path).st_mode)
owner_permissions = int(oct_mode[-3])
group_permissions = int(oct_mode[-2])
other_permissions = int(oct_mode[-1])
if other_permissions >= 4 or \
(file_owner == username and owner_permissions >= 4) or \
(username in group_members and group_permissions >= 4):
return True
return False
def full_path_permission_for_user(prefix, path, username, skip_prefix=False):
"""
Assuming username is identical to the os username, this checks that the
given user can read the specified path by checking the file permission
and each parent directory permission.
:type prefix: string
:param prefix: a directory under which ``path`` is to be checked
:type path: string
:param path: a filename to check
:type username: string
:param username: a username matching the systems username
:type skip_prefix: bool
:param skip_prefix: skip the given prefix from being checked for permissions
"""
full_path = realpath(join(prefix, path))
top_path = realpath(prefix) if skip_prefix else None
can_read = __path_permission_for_user(full_path, username)
if can_read:
depth = 0
max_depth = full_path.count(separator)
parent_path = dirname(full_path)
while can_read and depth != max_depth:
if parent_path in [separator, top_path]:
break
if not __path_permission_for_user(parent_path, username):
can_read = False
depth += 1
parent_path = dirname(parent_path)
return can_read
[docs]def joinext(root, ext):
"""
Roughly the reverse of os.path.splitext.
:type root: string
:param root: part of the filename before the extension
:type root: string
:param ext: the extension
:rtype: string
:returns: ``root`` joined with ``ext`` separated by a single ``os.extsep``
"""
return extsep.join((root.rstrip(extsep), ext.lstrip(extsep)))
[docs]def has_ext(path, ext, aliases=False, ignore=None):
"""
Determine whether ``path`` has extension ``ext``
:type path: string
:param path: Path to check
:type ext: string
:param ext: Extension to check
:type aliases: bool
:param aliases: Check any known aliases for the given extension
:type ignore: string
:param ignore: Ignore this extension at the end of the path (e.g. ``sample``)
:rtype: bool
:returns: ``True`` if path is a YAML file, ``False`` otherwise.
"""
ext = __ext_strip_sep(ext)
root, _ext = __splitext_ignore(path, ignore=ignore)
if aliases:
return _ext in extensions[ext]
else:
return _ext == ext
[docs]def get_ext(path, ignore=None, canonicalize=True):
"""
Return the extension of ``path``
:type path: string
:param path: Path to check
:type ignore: string
:param ignore: Ignore this extension at the end of the path (e.g. ``sample``)
:type canonicalize: bool
:param canonicalize: If the extension is known to this module, return the canonicalized extension instead of the
file's actual extension
:rtype: string
"""
root, ext = __splitext_ignore(path, ignore=ignore)
if canonicalize:
try:
ext = extensions.canonicalize(ext)
except KeyError:
pass # should do something else here?
return ext
class Extensions(dict):
"""Mappings for extension aliases.
A dict-like object that returns values for keys that are not mapped if the key can be found in any of the dict's
values (which should be sequence types).
The first item in the sequence should match the key and is the "canonicalization".
"""
def __missing__(self, key):
for v in self.values():
if key in v:
self[key] = v
return v
raise KeyError(key)
def canonicalize(self, ext):
# shouldn't raise an IndexError because it should raise a KeyError first
return self[ext][0]
extensions = Extensions({
'ini': ['ini'],
'json': ['json'],
'yaml': ['yaml', 'yml'],
})
def external_chown(path, pwent, external_chown_script, description="file"):
"""
call the external chown script (if not None) to change
the user and group of the given path, and additional description
of the file/path for the log message can be given
return
- None if external_chown_script is None
- True in case of success
- False in case of failure
"""
if external_chown_script is None:
return None
try:
cmd = shlex.split(external_chown_script)
cmd.extend([path, pwent[0], str(pwent[3])])
log.debug('Changing ownership of {} with: {}'.format(path, ' '.join(cmd)))
galaxy.util.commands.execute(cmd)
return True
except galaxy.util.commands.CommandLineException as e:
log.warning('Changing ownership of {} {} failed: {}'.format(description, path, galaxy.util.unicodify(e)))
return False
def __listify(item):
"""A non-splitting version of :func:`galaxy.util.listify`.
"""
if not item:
return []
elif isinstance(item, list) or isinstance(item, tuple):
return item
else:
return [item]
# helpers
def __walk(path):
for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in walk(path):
for name in dirnames:
yield join(dirpath, name)
for name in filenames:
yield join(dirpath, name)
def __contains(prefix, path, allowlist=None, real=None):
real = real or realpath(join(prefix, path))
yield not relpath(real, prefix).startswith(pardir)
for aldir in allowlist or []:
# a path is under the allowlist if the relative path between it and the allowlist does not have to go up (..)
yield not relpath(real, aldir).startswith(pardir)
def __ext_strip_sep(ext):
return ext.lstrip(extsep)
def __splitext_no_sep(path):
path = galaxy.util.unicodify(path)
return (path.rsplit(extsep, 1) + [''])[0:2]
def __splitext_ignore(path, ignore=None):
# note: unlike os.path.splitext this strips extsep from ext
ignore = map(__ext_strip_sep, __listify(ignore))
root, ext = __splitext_no_sep(path)
if ext in ignore:
new_path = path[0:(-len(ext) - 1)]
root, ext = __splitext_no_sep(new_path)
return (root, ext)
# cross-platform support
def _build_self(target, path_module):
"""Populate a module with the same exported functions as this module, but using the given os.path module.
:type target: module
:param target: module on which to set ``galaxy.util.path`` functions
:type path_module: ``ntpath`` or ``posixpath`` module
:param path_module: module implementing ``os.path`` API to use for path functions
"""
__copy_self().__set_fxns_on(target, path_module)
def __copy_self(names=__name__, parent=None):
"""Returns a copy of this module that can be modified without modifying `galaxy.util.path`` in ``sys.modules``.
"""
if isinstance(names, str):
names = iter(names.split('.'))
try:
name = next(names)
except StopIteration:
return parent
path = parent and parent.__path__
parent = imp.load_module(name, *imp.find_module(name, path))
return __copy_self(names, parent)
def __set_fxns_on(target, path_module):
"""Overrides imported os.path functions with the ones from path_module and populates target with the global
functions from this module.
"""
for name in __pathfxns__:
globals()[name] = getattr(path_module, name)
__get = partial(getitem, globals())
__set = partial(setattr, target)
# this is actually izip(..., imap(...))
__fxns = zip(__all__, map(__get, __all__))
# list() to execute
list(starmap(__set, __fxns))
__pathfxns__ = (
'abspath',
'basename',
'exists',
'isabs',
'join',
'normpath',
'pardir',
'realpath',
'relpath',
)
__all__ = (
'extensions',
'get_ext',
'has_ext',
'joinext',
'safe_contains',
'safe_makedirs',
'safe_relpath',
'safe_walk',
'unsafe_walk',
)